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1. Introduction 
In response to the financial crisis, many central banks are taking on significant new 
responsibilities for macroprudential supervision. Based on the experience of central banks 
with financial stability reports (FSRs) and other financial stability-related statements, this 
article argues that such central bank communication can be highly effective, especially 
during periods of financial stress. The findings underline the importance of designing a well 
differentiated communication strategy on macroprudential issues. 
2. Theoretical  considerations 
Several arguments have been put forward to justify why central banks are taking on a 
prominent role in macroprudential supervision: combining financial supervision with monetary 
policy tasks can lead to synergies and a more effective conduct of monetary policy 
(Borio (2009)); it may be usefully connected to the central banks’ lender of last resort function 
(Blinder (2010)); or because central banks could benefit from incorporating systemic risk 
considerations in the monetary policy process given the costs of asset price bubbles 
(Feldstein (2010)).  
Yet numerous risks in assigning such a task to central banks have also been emphasised: it 
may at times lead to conflicts among different goals (Goodhart and Shoenmaker (2005), 
De Grauwe and Gros (2009)); and it may be costly for the reputation of central banks if they 
fail in their macroprudential tasks, a point that was originally made in the context of 
microprudential tasks (Goodhart (2002)), but is equally valid here. 
However, what has been missing in this debate so far is evidence about whether, and under 
what conditions, central banks may actually be effective in guiding financial markets through 
their role in macroprudential supervision. New research (Born et al (2010)) attempts to 
address this question by exploiting the fact that many central banks have had some financial 
stability role in the past, and have communicated extensively on this through the publication 
of FSRs and financial stability-related speeches and interviews.  
3. Empirical  results 
This research creates a novel database comprising more than 1,000 FSRs and 
speeches/interviews by central bank governors across 36 countries, and based on their 
semantic features, grades these along optimism and activity dimensions. In line with the aims 
put forward by Blinder et al (2008), such communication is defined to be effective if the views 
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that it contains are reflected in the markets; either by “creating news” – moving the level of 
asset prices – or by “reducing noise” – reducing market volatility and uncertainty. 
A first striking finding from this classification is that the tone of FSRs became continuously 
more optimistic after 2000, but reached a peak in early 2006, thereafter becoming more 
pessimistic (see Figure 1). This suggests that FSRs, across the 36 countries in the sample, 
may also contain a forward-looking assessment of risks and vulnerabilities, which flagged a 
weakening financial stability environment well before the start of the financial crisis in 
August 2007. 
Figure 1 
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Notes: The figure plots the median, 25th and 75th percentile of the optimism scores for 
FSRs in any given year.  
Moreover, the empirical findings of this work suggest that communication about financial 
stability has important repercussions for financial sector stock prices. FSRs clearly create 
news in the sense that stock markets move in line with the views expressed in FSRs. This 
effect is quite sizeable as, on average, FSR releases move equity markets by 2% during the 
subsequent month, as shown in Figure 2, relative to the counterfactual. Another important 
finding is that FSRs also reduce noise, as market volatility tends to decline in response to 
FSRs. 
By contrast, speeches and interviews are, on average, less effective instruments. In 
particular, while having only modest effects on stock market returns, they tend to increase 
rather than reduce market volatility (in particular during the crisis). However, the 
effectiveness of FSRs and speeches crucially depends on market conditions. Importantly, 
speeches by central bank governors were effective in guiding financial markets during times 
of financial stress. Moreover, the results indicate that the financial stability communication of 
central banks influences financial markets primarily via a coordination channel, ie it provides 
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Notes: The figure compares the actual evolution of cumulated stock market returns (in 
per cent) following the release of FSRs to the predicted trend on the basis of the benchmark 
model. The solid line plots the average actual cumulated returns starting from day 1 after the 
FSR release and up to day 60. The dashed line shows the expected cumulative returns that 
would result from the benchmark model in the absence of an FSR. The cumulative returns are 
multiplied by –1 for pessimistic FSRs, whereas they are left unchanged for optimistic FSRs.  
How can we explain that FSRs overall reduce noise, ie lower stock market volatility, whereas 
speeches and interviews generally have the opposite effect? A crucial difference between these 
communication tools is that the release schedule of FSRs is typically pre-announced, whereas 
the timing of speeches and interviews is much more flexible. Given this flexibility, speeches and 
interviews might carry some surprise element, simply due to the fact that a governor feels 
compelled to raise financial stability issues in a speech or an interview. In contrast, due to the 
fixed release schedule for FSRs, financial markets expect statements about financial stability 
issues on the release days. There might be surprising elements in their content, but the mere fact 
that the FSR is released does not come as a surprise. This difference might be at the heart of the 
different effects of the two instruments on market volatility.  
4. Conclusion 
The empirical findings of this new work raise a number of important policy issues. 
Communication on financial stability issues by a central bank with a macroprudential policy 
role will certainly be watched very closely by financial markets, and thus are potentially an 
important influence on financial markets. Does this imply that central banks should limit 
transparency and their communication on certain macroprudential risks, as argued by 
Cukierman (2009), or does this make the case for enhanced transparency and 
accountability, as argued by others? The findings of the work show that communication by 
monetary authorities on financial stability issues can indeed influence financial market 
developments. Yet the findings also show that such communication entails risks as it may 
unsettle markets. Hence central bank communication on macroprudential issues needs to be 
employed with the utmost care, underlining the difficulty of designing a successful 
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